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A
chieving the goal of peace through
national reconciliation and devel-
opment has become the paramount
concern of the government after the
fall of the Marcos regime and President Aquino’s
assumption of office in 1986. Thus, through the
years, peace efforts have increasingly focused on
the resolution of the internal strife with various
rebel groups, notably the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) move-
ment, the Muslim secessionists, and the Cordil-
lera rebels.
As studies indicate, the armed conflict in the Phil-
ippines is more than an issue of differences in
political and ideological beliefs, and views on
the presence of foreign intervention and domina-
tion. The root causes actually involve legitimate
socioeconomic and political issues such as rela-
tive/absolute deprivation, (political, social and
cultural) marginalization, landlessness, militari-
zation, human rights violations, and resource
exploitation (Ferrer 2004). These concerns actu-
ally parallel those identified by the National
Unification Commission (NUC) in its 1993
sectoral consultations as the root causes of gov-
ernment armed conflict with the CPP-NPA-NDF
and the Muslim rebels.
One of the conflict-stricken areas in the Philip-
pines is Bicol, the third poorest region in the coun-
try.1 Fifty three percent of its population live be-
low the poverty line—19 percentage points higher
than the national figure of 34 percent. Bicol also
has the worst poverty situation in Luzon. Box 1
provides a poverty profile of the region while Fig-
ure 1 shows the map of the Bicol region.
______________
1 The two regions exhibiting poverty incidence higher than




Pockets of armed conflict between the military
and the CPP-NPA in Bicol that span more than
three decades have claimed numerous lives, in-
cluding the future of innocent children, and led
to the displacement of many from their homes
and livelihoods. The conflict has also exacerbated
the poverty and underdevelopment within the
communities it directly affects and the region at
large, taking its toll on an economy already suf-
fering from severe poverty.
As this Notes will show, the price of the armed
conflict in Bicol does not come cheap. It involves
considerable social, financial and economic
costs, and negative (and some positive) spillovers.
The bulk of the data were gathered from second-
ary sources such as newspaper articles and peri-
odic reports from regional offices of the Depart-
ment of Social Welfare and Development, the
Commission on Human Rights, the Philippine
National Police city and municipal stations
(Camalig, Ligao and Libon, in Albay), a local
radio station in Albay, (i.e., DWBS Radyo Veritas
Legazpi), and articles published in the Internet.
Coordinators of cause-oriented groups, residents
of areas where CPP-NPAs maintain zones, and
human rights advocates also served as key infor-
mants.
Costs and spillovers
Social and political costs
Combat-related deaths, recruitment of children,
and displacement of civilians constitute the scores
of social costs that can be linked to the armed
conflict in Bicol. The damage is particularly high-
est in Camarines Sur and Albay where the CPP-
NPA forces are believed to be strongest and the
conflict most intense, but more recently, armed
encounters, atrocities and other types of human
rights violations have also been reported in
Sorsogon, Masbate, and Catanduanes.
Figure 1. Map of Bicol region
Land area: 1,763,249 hectares (17,632.42 square kilometers)
By province: Camarines Sur  – 526,682 hectares
Masbate – 404,769 hectares
Albay – 255,257 hectares
Sorsogon – 214,140 hectares
Camarines Norte – 211,249 hectares
Catanduanes – 151,148 hectares
Population (2000): 4.675 million
Most populated: Camarines Sur – 1,551,549
Least populated: Catanduanes – 215,356
Located at the southeastern most tip of Luzon, the Bicol Peninsula is surrounded by
seas. It is accessible to Manila and the rest of Luzon by land (through its neighboring
province, Quezon), railway, air and sea. It takes about nine hours to reach Naga City
by land from Manila and 45 minutes by air transportation.
The region is composed of six provinces. The four contiguous provinces of Camarines
Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay, and Sorsogon comprise the mainland, while isolated from
the mainland by sea are the two island provinces of Catanduanes and Masbate. The
region’s topography is generally hilly and mountainous except for a few stretches of
plains extending Camarines Sur to the southwestern part of Albay and several smaller
coastal and inland plains in other parts of the peninsula. This characteristic of the region’s




As many as 25,000 combat-related deaths have
occurred since 1969 when open hostilities be-
tween the military and the CPP-NPA organiza-
tion began. In 2000, at least 49 persons in the
region were killed, and at least three women in
Barangay Pawa, Masbate in 1999 were included
among the 115 persons killed nationwide.
The exploitation of children as soldiers, spies or
messengers is another grave impact of the con-
flict, clearly a violation of the rights of children.
There were reports of the NPA recruiting children
into their ranks, which has been attributed to the
increase in the strength and number of firearms
of the rebel groups in the Bicol region. Based on
reports, recruited are mostly adventurous high
school students in remote areas who are particu-
larly vulnerable to the lures of combat as well as
progressive college students of some universities
and state colleges in the region who are easily
enticed to join because of their political ideolo-
gies.
Furthermore, over 50,000 people have been dis-
placed by the conflict. For example, in Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, some families had to move from
their homes where the CPP-NPA groups are main-
taining zones leaving their farms untilled after
resettling in the poblacion (town center). Another
example is the displacement of some 500 fami-
lies in Barangay Bulalakao Presentacion when
men posing as NPAs started harassing them. Be-
cause of a previous incident when military sol-
diers also posed as NPAs, the families immedi-
ately vacated the area. People were terrorized
when the men started hopping from house to house
to eliminate suspected rebels.
The extortion activities of the rebels are also a
source of hardship for the affected groups. It is
believed that they resort to these activities to in-
crease their resources and build their logistics.
The extortion was in high gear during the 2004
national elections wherein the rebels exacted
money from politicians in exchange for a permit
to campaign. Many politicians especially in
Albay were reported to have yielded to this coer-
cive act of the rebel groups. A more recent inci-
dent involved the burning of a four-classroom
school building at the Cancahorao Elementary
School compound in Baleno, Masbate after the
teacher-in-charge failed to pay extortion money.
Another serious cost of the armed conflict per-
tains to the numerous incidences of insurgency-
related human rights (HR) violations carried out
by either the military or the CPP-NPA forces. The
long list of violations includes killings and ab-
ductions, arbitrary arrest and detention, illegal
search, physical arrest and torture, grave threats
and coercion, and illegal trespassing to dwell-
ings.
For the period 2000-2004 alone, about 81 cases
were monitored by the Commission on Human
Rights Region V, with the highest number of vio-
lations taking place in Albay (39), Camarines Sur
(19), and Sorsogon (12), as shown in Table 1. Out
of these 81 cases, a total of 170 violations were
recorded, in which there were more male than
female victims (Figure 2).
Financial and/or economic costs
The extent of financial losses resulting from the
armed conflict may be gauged from the bombing
incidents and destruction to properties perpetrated
by the rebel groups. The cases of destruction to
properties are believed to be the rebels’ act of
retaliation to the owner’s failure to meet their
demand for revolutionary tax. Huge amounts of
money are funneled into the hands of the rebel
groups in the form of revolutionary tax which,
from their perspective, is a legitimate way of
generating funds for the revolutionary government.
The rebel groups reportedly have an organized
system of tax collection. They have their own
finance officer and there are also tax collectors.
(Some barangay officials were reported to be
working as tax collectors.) Taxes are collected
from farmers every harvest time, from fisherfolk,
and from small businesses in the community such
as videoke bars and sari-sari stores. They are also
collected from government projects and privatePN 2006-04
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contractors of infrastructure projects (roads and
bridges, electrification, irrigation, and other civil
works). Although most people perceive the sys-
tem as plain and simple extortion, many business
owners give in to the demands of the NPAs for
fear of harassment and stoppage of their business
operation. For civil works, the range of revolu-
tionary tax imposed is anywhere between 5 and
10 percent of the project cost regardless of the
nature of the project. A civil engineer key
informant puts the estimated cost of the
revolutionary tax at P110,000 for a project
cost of P1 million for the building of a one-
kilometer road.
Recent attacks on the cell sites of the three
biggest telecom companies in the country
(Globe, Smart, and RCPI/Bayantel), which
took place in five separate incidents in
2002-2003, are believed to be a result of
their inability to meet the tax demand of
the rebel groups. They reportedly demand from
P50,000 to P200,000 as yearly tax per site, and
as much as P500,000 for a newly set up cell site.
An informant puts the approximate cost of dam-
age from the bombing of the cell sites from P1 to
P2 million per cell site if only the base is de-
stroyed; if the entire cell site is destroyed, the
cost of rebuilding it may be anywhere between
P10 and P20 million. Smart and Globe are said to
Table 1. Summary of human rights violation cases related to armed conflict in the Bicol region
by province, 2000-2004
Cases Albay Camarines Norte Camarines Sur Catanduanes Masbate Sorsogon Total
Killing of civilian by the NPA 16 2 4 4 8 34
Killing of the AFP by the NPA 5 3 1 2 3 14
Killing of the CPP/NPA by the PA 4 1 5
Killing of civilian by the PA 3 1 4
Killing of civilian by the NPP/PA
(crossfire victims) 1 2 3
Encounters/ambush 2 2
Harassment/fear of PA/grave
threats (per location) 4 4 8
Less serious physical injuries
by the NPA 1 1
Less serious physical injuries
by the PA 1 1
Serious physical injuries
by the PA 1 1
Damage to property by the PA 1 1
Theft/robbery by the PA 1 1
Torture/mauling by the PA 3 3
Acts of lasciviousness
by the PA/PNP 1 1
Unlawful arrest by the PA 1
Total 39 5 19 6 12 81




be two of the biggest sources of revolutionary tax
of the NPAs in Bicol. An addition to these bomb-
ing incidents is the burning of the St. Jude,
Raymond and Philtranco buses. The owners re-
portedly incurred losses amounting to P24.7 mil-
lion.
A glaring evidence of the armed conflict’s nega-
tive spillover is its adverse effect on the growth
and development of the areas where the insur-
gents maintain a stronghold. Undoubtedly, the
volatile peace and order situation translates to
hefty sum of forgone investments and lost oppor-
tunities that could have otherwise been benefi-
cial for the region’s development and especially
for improving the social and economic conditions
of the poor.
A case in point is the $50-million World Bank-
funded Community-based Resource Management
Project (CBRMP) that was prevented from taking
off after some members of the NPA reportedly sent
letters to the LGU project coordinators asking
them to discontinue their activities. These cases
were reported in the municipalities of Castilla and
Magallanes in Sorsogon, San Miguel in
Catanduanes, and Presentacion and Bato in
Camarines Sur, all NPA strongholds in Sorsogon
and Camarines Sur (Calara 2002). This coercive
act of the rebels even led to the discontinuation
of the project in Presentacion. A marble-cutting
industry was also halted in the same town due to
the very high cost of revolutionary tax being de-
manded by the rebels.
A serious repercussion of this practice by the
rebels is the loss of confidence by investors for
fear of being harassed. In fact, there were cases
of entrepreneurs preferring to put up their estab-
lishments (agricultural supplies/equipment, rice
mills or metal craft) in the town centers and not
anywhere outside to evade the tax collection of
the rebel groups. Plans for putting up additional
cell sites and expansion of the communication
lines in Bicol were also frequently deferred for
long periods pending the search for a suitable
place to avoid the high tax requirement of the
NPA groups or the destruction of cell sites in case
of nonpayment.
Negative (and some positive) spillovers
Geographic impact
The hilly and mountainous terrain of the Bicol
region makes it very conducive for the growth
and movement of rebel groups. The poor state of
rural infrastructure is also one of the main prob-
lems that hamper the region’s growth. One of the
infrastructure projects carried out in the past de-
cade to support the development of Bicol is the
construction of the Quirino Highway that con-
nects the entire Luzon to the Bicol region. The
Quirino Highway was a welcome relief to most
Bicolanos when it was opened because it short-
ened the travel time although its construction took
several years to complete due to the harassment
activities in the area.
Intergenerational impact
Families of rebels, especially children, are cer-
tainly living in poverty and deprived of the ben-
efits of education in the absence of a provider, a
cycle that is repeated in the succeeding genera-
tions. Orphaned children of rebels, including those
of the military, stand to suffer most from the loss
in terms of better education and opportunities for
a better future.
Land reform
Rebel groups in remote upland areas with absen-
tee landowners have developed a reciprocal ar-
rangement with the farmers. In return for allow-
A glaring evidence of the armed conflict’s negative
spillover is its adverse effect on the growth and
development of the areas where the insurgents
maintain a stronghold. Undoubtedly, the volatile
peace and order situation translates to hefty sum of
forgone investments and lost opportunities that could
have otherwise been beneficial for the region’s
development and especially for improving the social
and economic conditions of the poor.PN 2006-04
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ing them to cultivate or maintain the lands that
the rebels have illegally seized, the farmers serve
as their “eyes and ears” or “asset,” or poste as
they are locally called. In other cases, the rebels
take control of lands foreclosed by the bank after
the original owner has failed to redeem it by re-
paying a loan for which the land serves as collat-
eral. As in the first case, the farmers serve as poste
in exchange for the privilege of cultivating the
land.
On one hand, this kind of illegal land acquisition
serves to fulfill the rebels’ mission of instituting
revolutionary land reform. On the other hand, it
may be viewed both as a positive or negative
spillover: positive because the benefits of tilling
the land directly accrue to the poor farmers, and
negative because the real owners of the land lose
their right to sell the land through the voluntary
offer-to-sell (VOS) program of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Also in connection with the sec-
ond case, the bank loses its legitimate preroga-
tive to recover even part of the amount it has
expended as loan to the original landowner.
Social services
The animosity between the military and certain
cause-oriented groups like the Bayan Muna,
Gabriela, and Anak Pawis has sometimes led to
the failure of some communities in remote areas
of Bicol to avail of the much-needed health ser-
vices and medicines. An example is the joint
medical mission of the UNICEF Psychosocial
Therapy for Children and a cause-oriented group
in November 2004. The mission was almost halted
when an army officer approached the UNICEF
group to ask if there are members of cause-ori-
ented organizations in their team. The UNICEF
group had to do some serious explaining to the
military to persuade the latter to allow their mem-
bers to proceed with the medical mission.
Environmental concerns
There were reported cases of illegal fishing in
connivance with either the military or the rebel
groups in the third district of Albay. It is believed
that they may be taxing the fishermen. The de-
struction of the environment also remains un-
abated as the local government units have diffi-
culty in implementing the laws in the remote ar-
eas. There are also reports of NPAs involved in
illegal logging or people engaged in illegal log-
ging and paying revolutionary tax to the NPAs.
These practices effectively lead to the prolifera-
tion of illegal activities that are destructive to
the environment. It is difficult to see how these
activities may be abated when the rebel groups
could freely impose their authority in their base
areas and when local officials are condoning these
illegal activities in exchange for some conces-
sions. The problem is both an environmental and
a governance concern.
Effect on governance
The failure of some candidates to reach the re-
mote areas during the campaign period because
of their nonpayment of the permit to campaign or
their not being able to seek a compromise for the
purpose deprives the residents in these areas of
valuable information for their meaningful partici-
pation in the political exercise. Consequently, this
situation undermines the people’s right to free par-
ticipation in the electoral process as they are de-
nied of the means to know the candidates and
decide whom to vote for. It also raises questions
as to how a free and honest election could be
guaranteed in the area. On the other hand, politi-
cians who submit to the authority of the rebels
are helping to perpetuate these unlawful activi-
ties while tacitly acknowledging the mandate of
the revolutionary government.
Security of buildings and properties
The increase in nonlife insurance premiums to
protect commercial and industrial establishments
and other properties is a consequence of the rebels’
indiscriminate practice of destroying properties
when owners are not able to meet their revolu-
tionary tax obligation. This negatively impacts
not only on the business owners but also on the
consumers whenever the owners pass on to them
the burden in the form of higher prices. InsurancePN 2006-04
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premiums for ordinary and first-class buses may
also increase, which may result in corresponding
increases in bus fares.
Cost of infrastructure projects
Allocating additional budget in anticipation of
the NPA revolutionary tax effectively increases
the cost of government infrastructure projects. By
virtually channeling its already meager resources
to sustain the needs of the rebels, the govern-
ment ends up short of funds to finance more ben-
eficial projects. In the same vein, the payment
of the permit to campaign which reportedly is
taken from the politician’s community develop-
ment fund or the giving of a certain portion of
the barangay’s internal revenue allotment to settle
the revolutionary tax payment is tantamount to
depriving the communities of the much-needed
capital to pursue even small development
projects that could help in the improvement of
the socioeconomic conditions of their constitu-
ents. Even the likelihood that the institutional-
ization of the revolutionary tax payment may lead
to corruption is also not remote.
An urgent call
Given the high cost of the social, economic and
political impacts of the armed conflict in Bicol,
there is clearly an immediate need in the short
term for measures to mitigate the effects of the
armed conflict. On the part of the government, a
joint AFP, PNP and LGU Peace Forum is being
conducted. Its activities include information dis-
semination, grand pulong-pulong, launching of
the Kalahi Info Caravan, medical and dental out-
reach programs, and socials or sports and enter-
tainment activities.
In the long term, however, what is needed is a
comprehensive program on peace building, one
that addresses the real causes of the insurgency
and views human security not from a purely state
security approach.
The government’s strategy in solving the country’s
insurgency problem is a two-pronged approach
that consists of a left hand and a right hand. “The
right hand is through the arm of the law, and the
left hand is the hand of peace and development,”
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo said. (http://
www.gov.ph/news/?newsid=3272.)
As a national strategy, this approach has been
translated into “the Strategy of Holistic Ap-
proach,” with components addressing the politi-
cal, legal and diplomatic situations, the socio-
economic-psychosocial realm, the peace and or-
der and security, and information. It points to in-
surgency as not only a result of poverty but also
of ignorance (lack of good education), disease
(poor health and malnutrition), and injustice (hu-
man rights violations, graft and corruption, and
land conflicts). This approach was based on the
new model of human security which looks at the
armed conflict not merely as a result of extreme
poverty but as something that is deeply rooted in
grave injustice and inequity, as well as other op-
pressive situations that undermine the dignity of
a person. 
References
Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS). 2002.
National Statistics Office. Republic of the
Philippines.
Calara, P. 2002. $50-M WB project refuses to take
off in Bicol. Available from the World Wide
Web: http://www.bulatlat.com/news/2-13/2-
13-calara.html.
Ferrer, M. 2004. War cost and peace benefits: the
nexus of peace and development (the
Mindanao case).
For further information, please contact
The Research Information Staff
Philippine Institute for Development Studies
NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, 1229 Makati City
Telephone Nos: (632) 892-4059 and 893-5705
Fax Nos: (632) 893-9589 and 816-1091
E-mail: jvlobrigo@hotmail.com; jliguton@pidsnet.pids.gov.ph
The Policy Notes series is available online at http://www.pids.gov.ph. Reentered as
second class mail at the Business Mail Service Office under Permit No. PS-570-04
NCR. Valid until December 31, 2006.PN 2006-04
8
Policy Notes
Box 1. Bicol: a profile of poverty
Despite large tracks of fertile soil suited for the cultivation of a wide variety of crops, Bicol suffers from low productivity.
Located within the so-called typhoon belt, it is seriously affected by frequent visits of typhoons each year. This has been
the most serious problem that besets the region and the reason why it has remained to be one of the poorest in the
country. The situation is made even worse by extreme weather abnormalities such as the El Niño and the La Niña,
which, of late, are becoming more frequent and intense than in previous decades.
Based on the 2002 Annual Poverty Indicator Survey (APIS) data, Bicol has the largest proportion of families (62.8%)
falling within the lowest 40 percent income range—22.8 percentage points higher than the national figure of 40 percent.
Although these figures closely approximate the national statistics for rural areas (60.3%), they reflect a far worse
situation than the Cordillera Administrative Region (41.4%). The average family size for the region which is 5.2 is also
higher compared with other Luzon provinces, a factor which more likely contributes to the poverty of the Bicolanos.
Among the Bicol provinces, Masbate is the poorest with a poverty incidence of 70.8 percent in 2000. Measures of depth
and severity of poverty also point to Masbate as the most disadvantaged while Catanduanes appears to be the least
deprived among the six provinces. Measures of human development—the human development index (HDI) and the
human poverty index (HPI)—also showed Masbate as one of the poorest performing provinces in the country, ranking
72nd in both HPI an HDI in 2000 among the 77 provinces in the country.
Substantial increases in unemployment rates from 1997 to 2000 were also evident in the six provinces, with the
situation particularly severe in Camarines Sur (from 8.4 to 10.5) and Catanduanes (from 6.1 to 10.4). Generally,
however, the unemployment rates in the Bicol region do not significantly depart from the national figures of 8.6 in 1997
and 11.1 in 2000.
Only a little more than two-thirds of the Bicol population 6 to 24 years old (70.5%) are currently attending school,
closely approximating the national situation of 69 percent. When disaggregated by age group, a slight deviation from
the national picture is observed with 60.3 percent of the Bicol children aged 6 to 12 attending school as compared to
56.8 percent nationwide. The reverse is true for the 17 to 24 age group, where the proportion of those attending school
in Bicol (14.2%) is slightly lower than the national level (17.5).
Three major reasons emerged in the APIS data for the nonschooling status of a large segment of the school-age
population, namely: (1) the need for employment or to look for work; (2) not being able to afford the expenses on
schooling; and (3) lack of personal interest. Other factors include the absence of a school within the barangay or the
school is located at some distance and absence of regular transportation facilities or good road network, illness or
disability, or difficulty in coping with school work.
In terms of income distribution as measured by the Gini index, Albay and Masbate have the greatest income inequality
in year 2000 (42.1 and 38.9, respectively). Sorsogon exhibits the lowest, with 32.3. While the drop in their Gini
measures from 1997 to 2000 projects an improved income distribution for Catanduanes, Camarines Sur, Camarines
Norte and Sorsogon, the slight increase in income inequality exhibited by Albay and Masbate over the same period
presents an interesting contrast.
The large majority of the poor in Bicol can be found in the agriculture sector, which mainly includes crop farmers
categorized as small farm owners-cultivators, landless rural agricultural workers, and marginal upland farmers. The
latter comprise the most vulnerable group because they live close to areas maintained by rebel groups and are also the
most disadvantaged in terms of access to basic social services.